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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we present a software tool to help emergency
planners at Hampshire County Council in the UK to create
maps for high-delity crowd simulations that require evac-
uation routes from buildings to roads. The main feature
of the system is a crowdsourcing mechanism that breaks
down the problem of creating evacuation routes into micro-
tasks that a contributor to the platform can execute in less
than a minute. As part of the mechanism we developed
a concensus-based trust mechanism that lters out incor-
rect contributions and ensures that the individual tasks are
complete and correct. To drive people to contribute to the
platform, we experimented with dierent incentive mecha-
nisms and applied these over dierent time scales, the aim
being to evaluate what incentives work with dierent types
of crowds, including anonymous contributors from Amazon
Mechanical Turk. The results of the `in the wild' deployment
of the system show that the system is eective at engaging
contributors to perform tasks correctly and that users re-
spond to incentives in dierent ways. More specically, we
show that purely social motives are not good enough to at-
tract a large number of contributors and that contributors
are averse to the uncertainty in winning rewards. When
taken altogether, our results suggest that a combination of
incentives may be the best approach to harnessing the maxi-
mum number of resources to get socially valuable tasks (such
for planning applications) performed on a large scale.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.5 [World Wide Web]: Crowdsourcing
1. INTRODUCTION
The creation of high delity scenarios for disaster simulation
is a major challenge for a number of reasons. First, in the
UK, the maps supplied by existing map providers (e.g., Ord-
nance Survey, TeleAtlas) tend to provide only road or build-
ing shapes and do not accurately model open spaces which
people use to evacuate buildings, homes, or industrial facili-
ties (e.g. the space around a stadium or a commercial centre
both constitute evacuation routes of dierent shapes and
sizes). Secondly, even if some of the data about evacuation
routes is available, the real-world connection points between
these spaces and roads and buildings is usually not well de-
ned unless data from buildings' owners can be obtained
(e.g. building entrances, borders, and fences). Finally, in
order to augment current maps with accurate spatial data,
it would require either a good set of training data (which is
not available to our knowledge) for a computer vision algo-
rithm to dene evacuation routes using pictures (working on
aerial maps) or a signicant amount of manpower to directly
survey a vast area.
Against this background, we developed a novel model of
geospatial data creation, called CollabMap
1, that relies on
human computation. CollabMap is a crowdsourcing tool to
get users to perform micro-tasks that involve augmenting ex-
isting maps (e.g. Google Maps or Ordnance Survey) by draw-
ing evacuation routes, using satellite imagery from Google
Maps and panoramic views from Google StreetView. In a
similar vein to [12, 4], we use human computation to com-
plete tasks that are hard for a computer vision algorithm to
perform or to generate training data that could be used by
a computer vision algorithm to automatically dene evac-
uation routes. Compared to other community-driven plat-
forms such as OpenStreetMap and Google's MapMaker, Col-
labmap allows inexperienced and anonymous users to per-
form tasks without them needing the expertise to integrate
the data into the system (as in OpenStreetMap) and does
not rely on having experts verifying the tasks (as in Map-
Maker) in order to generate meaningful results.
To ensure that individual contributions are correct and com-
plete, we build upon the Find-Fix-Verify (FFV) pattern [1]
to develop a novel adaptive workow that includes concensus-
based trust metrics and allows the creation of new tasks
where no ground-truth is known. Our trust metrics allow
users to rate and correct each other's contributions while our
workow is adaptive in the sense that it allows the system
designer to improve the performance of the crowd accord-
ing to both the number and types of contributions into the
system. As we show in our results, this approach was ef-
fective in preventing workers from getting bored and taking
full advantage of users' motivation to contribute.
Given our implementation of the platform, we deployed our
1www.collabmap.orgsystem to help map the area around the Fawley Oil ren-
ery next to the city of Southampton in the UK over three
months. The area covered over 5,000 buildings (mainly res-
idential) with a population of about 10,000. We experi-
mented with dierent incentive mechanisms to incentivise
both the local community around the renery and other
agencies, and (our) University sta and students to con-
tribute to the platform. Thus, apart from using the moral
or intrinsic incentive to participate in the exercise, we at-
tempted to engage the crowd using dierent monetary incen-
tives in turn including lottery-based rewards and competition-
based rewards. As a benchmark, we also ran the system
using Amazon's Mechanical Turk (AMT) to hire users to
participate in the platform.
Our results show that the local community was not particu-
larly responsive to monetary rewards and that competition-
based rewards play a signicant factor in attracting users,
though not large numbers of them. Compared to results
from the AMT deployment, the results from local and Uni-
versity users were signicantly skewed. When taken to-
gether, these results allow us to claim that crowdsourcing
deployments require a number of dierent incentive schemes
to maximise the completion rate and quality of tasks, par-
ticularly when local knowledge is essential to guarantee a
high level of quality.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 surveys related work on crowdsourcing and incentive
schemes in crowdsourcing. Section 3 describes the design
principles behind Collabmap, while Section 4 elaborates on
the workow and interface design that build upon such prin-
ciples. Then, Section 5 describes our deployments of Col-
labmap under dierent incentive schemes and compares the
results of such deployments with that on AMT (Section 6).
Finally, Section 7 concludes and discusses the key implica-
tions of our work and point to future work.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
In what follows, we present related work and discuss how ap-
proaches within these elds relate to what we achieve in Col-
labmap. In particular, we focus on crowdsourced mapping
platforms, workows for crowdsourcing, trust and verica-
tion mechanisms in crowdsourcing, and most importantly,
on the use of incentives of dierent types in crowdsourcing.
2.1 Crowdsourced Mapping
The most well known example of crowdsourcing of mapping
tasks for disaster management is that of OpenStreetMap
2
where volunteers dedicate their free time to measure roads,
footpaths, and in some cases, buildings, in order to build
an accurate map. Other examples such as Crowdmap
3,
Google's MapMaker
4, or Geo-Wiki,
5 allow users to view ar-
eas on an existing map and annotate them with extra infor-
mation or identify mistakes in the maps.
Collabmap is similar to MapMaker and Geo-Wiki in that it
takes a top-down approach to mapping. By this we mean
that the contributors in Collabmap are given existing maps
2www.openstreetmap.org.
3http://crowdmap.com.
4www.google.com/mapmaker.
5www.geo-wiki.org.
or aerial pictures (or could be given satellite imagery like
Geo-Wiki) in order to create a map. OpenStreetMap (OSM),
on the other hand, takes a bottom-up approach to crowd-
sourcing in that the contributors have to physically visit
areas needing mapping and collect GPX data points. Users
can also edit maps using an browser-based editor. There
are trade-os in both approaches. Top-down mapping (in-
cluding the edit-mode of OSM) is obviously more accessible
to a larger pool of contributors sitting at their computers
looking at maps and therefore cheaper to contributors but
does require the task requester to have access to high quality
aerial maps or satellite imagery (in the case of Collabmap,
we utilised freely available images from GoogleMaps
6). On
the other hand, bottom-up mapping is costly for the contrib-
utors not only because it requires them to physically move
to certain places, but also because it requires them to per-
form accurate measurements and learn to upload such data
in the right format to the platform. This can be yet another
hurdle for novice contributors.
In one special instance similar to Collabmap (OSM does not
routinely use tracing from satellite imagery), OSM maps
were traced using satellite imagery from GeoEye in order to
permit the construction of one of the most accurate maps of
Port-au-Prince after the Haiti earthquake.
7 In that case, it
is not clear how many mappers were involved nor whether
there was any verication process for all the routes and
buildings drawn [15]. As Zook et al. point out, however,
for the purpose of disaster mapping, it was not so impor-
tant to have a highly accurate map and a good enough map
normally would do. While the contributions to the Haiti
earthquake mapping had a clear and urgent outcome (help-
ing to save lives) and therefore took only about a week, it is
not clear how such contributions could be incentivised from
a larger crowd in daily emergency planning applications like
ours. Moreover, a key challenge is to engage participants
with other motives than the interest in mapping (e.g., such
as a competition or a reward to map an area as in Col-
labmap) [4, 11]. This is a key distinction of our approach.
2.2 Workﬂows for Mapping
The crowdsourced mapping platforms mentioned in the pre-
vious section all require users to perform a set of key steps in
a certain order to contribute roads, buildings, or any other
measurements. These steps are very simple for Google's
MapMaker and Geo-Wiki. In these workow, the user lo-
cates an area of the map and identies a feature (e.g., re-
gion, location, building) and annotates it using mouse-clicks
and some text. For OpenStreetMap, specic measurements
taken on the ground using special devices need to be up-
loaded to the system. In both cases, uploads are checked by
expert volunteers (who have been pre-selected either through
a long verication process or were trusted by the system de-
signers). In the case of Collabmap, a similar approach is
taken in that, instead of having experts check a road or
building, Collabmap breaks down the mapping task into
small, easy-to-perform, tasks and gets each of them checked
by more than one other user (who may not be an expert).
6GoogleMap aerial imagery is not up-to-date but reasonably
accurate. If an up-to-date map were required, this would
come at a high cost and therefore render the top-down ap-
proach we take, very expensive.
7wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/WikiProject_Haiti/
Imagery_and_data_sources.Hence, Collabmap aims to achieve correctness via redun-
dancy (i.e., multiple users vote on the correctness of tasks)
similar to other platforms such as AMT. By so doing, Col-
labmap can eectively track the correctness of tasks per-
formed by each individual user, and hence her trustworthi-
ness. We elaborate on this point in the next section.
2.3 Trust and Veriﬁcation Mechanism
Trust is a key issue when it comes to giving tasks to anony-
mous contributors whose incentives may be just to make the
maximum prot by doing as many tasks as possible. While
in some platforms [1, 9] automatic verication processes are
put in place to make sure that workers do not get paid to
do tasks poorly, in other platforms experts are used to cor-
rect and train newcomers (e.g., in Google MapMaker and
OSM). As more information is acquired as contributors per-
form tasks, reputation metrics can be used to decide whether
to let them do more tasks or to ascribe a level of credibility
to their contributions (e.g., as in Yahoo Answers or AMT
where workers can be blocked).
A key issue with mapping tasks from aerial imagery and
street view is that many of the images can be outdated (as
users reported in our system). This means that the ground
truth cannot be obtained by simply looking at the pictures
and guring if the task was correctly performed. Moreover,
dierent users may have dierent views as to what an evac-
uation route consists of. Typically, in such cases where it is
either too expensive (to hire experts or to send a camera to
map the area) to get the ground truth, one would rely on
consensus metrics [9]. In Collabmap, we take an automatic
verication approach as experts are hard to nd for the tasks
at hand. In particular, as we show later we take a majority
voting approach aims to account for such uncertainties.
2.4 Incentives
A number of studies have been carried out to test how in-
centives aect the performance of the mapping crowd both
in terms of quality and quantity. In particular, we note
the work of [4], who describes the dierent types of map-
pers typically involved in crowdsourcing platforms. These
are: (i) Map lovers|a small group who produce trustable
and very valuable data, (ii) casual mappers|hikers, bikers,
mountaineers for example who spend little eort mapping,
(iii) experts|users in organisations that require mapping
such as mountain rescue, re brigades etc., (iv) media map-
pers|large groups motivated by competitions through me-
dia campaigns where the contributions are limited in time
and extent and a big initial eort for the campaign is needed,
(v) passive mappers|users with mobile phones or GPS po-
sitioning that may be unaware they are providing data to
a system, (vi) open mappers|users that spend a signi-
cant amount of time and eort to create open datasets such
as OSM, and nally (vii) Mechanical Turks|who perform
tasks against monetary payments. For example, while the
main contributors to OSM or MapMaker would particularly
be contributors of type (i) and (vi), while we would typically
t Collabmap into categories (iv) and (vii).
Now, the issue of incentives to perform tasks correctly and
completely is not typically addressed by the crowdsourcing
platforms above as these platforms usually rely on experts
to do the corrections. Instead, such issues are common in
other crowdsourcing domains to AMT or in large-scale de-
ployments like the Darpa Red Balloon Challenge [10] where
users are more interested in the nancial reward they oer,
however minute it might seem to be. Community-sourcing is
yet another recent approach that successfully engaged a local
specialised community in order to get expert tasks done for
small monetary rewards [3]. Gamication and monetary re-
wards have also been shown to be quite successful in the past
in getting the crowd to participate in short lived and focused
activities [2]. ESP games, for example, were very successful
not only because of the playfulness of the games but also
because players inherent competitiveness drove them to do
tasks. In contrast to such successful incentive mechanisms,
the MyHeartMap challenge
8, with the potential to generate
really strong intrinsic motivations, such monetary rewards
were less successful at engaging the crowd. Indeed, studies
by [2, 7] point to the fact that incentives of dierent types,
namely intrinsic (personal motivation as for map lovers), ex-
trinsic (monetary), and social (reputation based), can have
signicant impacts on the performance of a crowd. In par-
ticular, under controlled settings, Frindley et al. [2] report
that that social, intrinsic, and extrinsic incentives are all
eectual, but extrinsic incentives are the strongest in moti-
vating individuals towards prosocial crowdsourcing behavior.
Moreover, in some deployments, it has been shown that feed-
back provided by the platform and other contributors [14, 6]
gives better motivation and guidance to contributors to do
tasks and to do them correctly as well. In a similar vein, in
Collabmap, we experimented with all the three types of re-
wards and show that they are each benecial in bringing in
dierent types of contributors. Stretching the deployment of
Collabmap over time, along with dierent types of feedback
given to the crowd, allowed us to identify the most eective
methods to get people to do work for both monetary and
non-monetary rewards. Our results also corroborate the ex-
pectations of Mason and Watts (2009) in that the quality
of work that gets done by contributors with intrinsic mo-
tivation is higher than those with purely extrinsic or social
motivations [7]. Indeed, our results generalise theirs to some
extent beyond the context of AMT.
3. DESIGN PRINCIPLES
In this section we explain the key principles upon which we
designed Collabmap. In more detail, we can characterise the
work in Collabmap in terms of the architectural (i.e., work-
ow and task design), reward engineering (incentives and
engagement) and the quality assurance (trust and verica-
tion mechanism) elements it consists of. Our design assumes
that it is possible for both local inhabitants and remote users
on the web to work together to create an accurate map even
though remote users may not be familiar with the local en-
vironment being mapped|therefore relying on the local in-
habitants to correct their mistakes if any.
9 This was moti-
vated by the successful deployment of OpenStreetMap in the
Haiti Earthquake using a similar process and from the work
done on Google's MapMaker by anonymous contributors.
3.1 Workﬂow and Task Design
8www.med.upenn.edu/myheartmap/.
9Obviously having more local inhabitants to perform such a
task using GPS loggers would be the best option but this is
not always feasible.The workow adopted in Collabmap builds upon previous
divide-and-conquer approaches that have underpinned many
crowdsourcing and citizen science deployments over the last
few years such as [13] or [1]. Thus our workow divides
the task of drawing evacuation routes from a building into
a number of micro-tasks, each requiring seconds to complete.
This includes verifying whether the buildings or routes drawn
are correct and complete. This approach, while inspired
mainly by FFV, signicantly diers in that it incorporates
notions of trustworthiness, whereby redundant verication
or route checking tasks are used to make sure that every
`nd', `x', and `verify' task is viewed, corrected, or com-
pleted by every worker (see Section 4). Moreover, we present
a novel adaptive workow that can be quickly reformatted
(e.g., require fewer verications, or impose more or fewer re-
strictions on access to tasks) in order to allow the workow
to adapt to the performance of the crowd. In more detail, as
we show in evaluation section, for example, restricting users
to perform certain tasks in an attempt to prevent them from
validating their own work, may be unwieldy; and changing
the workow to let them do more work but get others to ver-
ify their work may be a more productive alternative. Our
approach alleviates the issue of boredom in the case contrib-
utors get to see too many of the same type of tasks.
In designing tasks, we followed some of the guidelines from
[8] by providing clear and accurate instructions, broken down
into a number of concrete steps to avoid misinterpretations
and boredom. As part of this, feedback was considered a
key element of the design. Thus, while performing individ-
ual tasks, feedback needs to be given to participants on the
validity of their actions and other participants' inputs into
the system. More importantly, feedback needs to be given
about how their contribution is helping to improve the ag-
gregate performance of the crowd. This allows them to see
the value of their work within the whole process.
3.2 Community Incentives and Engagement
Collabmap was designed with the premise that the local
community would be incentivised to help their local emer-
gency planners to be better prepared for disasters. Such
intrinsic motivations were taken as being the key driver for
contributions to the platform (our expectations were later
revealed to be less positive). However, we also anticipated
that participation from a local community (with no partic-
ular interest in Web technologies) would not be signicant.
To address this, we explored other incentive schemes that
could be used to incentivise crowds, including the use of
gamication and use of micro-payments per task.
Building upon this reasoning, in Collabmap, we applied dif-
ferent rewards (in order to generate intrinsic, extrinsic, and
social motivations) over dierent time-scales to tease out
their eectiveness at engaging dierent communities. This
diers from other approaches that have specically targeted
crowds of a certain type with the aim of identifying the rela-
tionship between incentives and task performance. Rather,
we are more interested in understanding how incentives can
be shaped to access dierent communities and what this
means for the quantity and quality of their contributions.
4. CROWDSOURCING WORKFLOW
CollabMap crowdsources the task of identifying building evac-
uation routes to a large number of contributors, by oering
them freely available data, such as satellite imagery (e.g.
Google Maps), and panoramic views (e.g. Google Streetview)
to carry out this task. By so doing, even users not familiar
with an area can potentially contribute evacuation routes
(though local inhabitants are expected to provide more ac-
curate data and tasks could be targeted at them if their
locations are known). The scope of a task is to identify a
single building, and each task follows a workow based on
a divide-and-conquer approach with verication processes
in-built [1].
4.1 Tasks
We divide the task of identifying evacuation routes for a sin-
gle building into smaller activities, called micro-tasks, car-
ried out by dierent contributors. We have designed ve
types of micro-task:
A. Building Identication The outline of a building is
drawn by clicking around the shape of a building on
the map. It serves as the basis for the other micro-
tasks.
B. Building Verication The building outline is assessed,
with a vote of either valid (+1) or invalid ( 1).
C. Route Identication An evacuation route is drawn by
clicking as many times as is needed along an observed
path, to connect an exit of the building to a nearby
road (which is connected to the building through a
footpath or a walkable/driveable space
10).
D. Route Verication The evacuation routes are assessed
for invalid routes. Those are marked as invalid receive
a  1 vote, while the rest get a +1 vote.
E. Completion Verication The set of evacuation routes
is assessed for exhaustiveness, with a vote of either
complete (+1) or incomplete ( 1).
The CollabMap workow (Figure 1) has two main phases:
Buildingphase The outline of a building that has no evac-
uation route needs to be drawn (A). The outline is
then checked by other contributors, who vote up or
vote down the building outline without seeing others'
votes (B). If the total score of the building, dened as
the sum of all the votes, reaches +3 then the Building
phase ends and the Evacuation route phase begins. If
the score reaches  2, the building outline is rejected
and marked as invalid.
Evacuationroutephase This is the main activity carried
out by CollabMap contributors. The rst is permit-
ted only to draw a route (C). Subsequent contributors
are asked to verify routes (D) and are asked whether
the set of routes is complete (E); if it is not, they are
invited to draw new routes (C). New routes may be
drawn if there are multiple walkways or open spaces
between the building and the road or where there are
multiple entrances through fences or walls. All likely
entry points from from a building to a road can there-
fore be considered (and may lead to some ambiguities
as we noted in our deployments).
10Users are not asked to draw a route over any part of the
road network but only over the space between the building
and the road.Figure 1: The CollabMap workow for identifying
evacuation routes of a building.
In both phases, in order to avoid biases (or obvious exploita-
tions of the workow), a contributor is not allowed to verify
his or her own work.
By only progressing tasks that obtain a small majority vote,
we aim to reduce the uncertainty inherent in these tasks,
particularly because in many cases the denition of an evac-
uation route or even a building may be dierent for dif-
ferent users (sometimes we found people understood a ter-
raced building to be a composition of several terraced houses
rather than a single building). However, our intuition was
that, by getting people to verify similar tasks done by other
participants (and seeing what was being drawn/accepted by
others), they would converge to an agreement about what
constituted an evacuation route and what did not. This was
indeed found in our deployment.
5. DEPLOYMENTS AND EVALUATION
To test whether Collabmap could achieve its objective of
creating a high resolution map of an area, we deployed Col-
labmap in two dierent settings: as an open web applica-
tion and as a separate AMT session. In the rst case, we
started the 3-month trial in December 2011 (we let the sys-
tem run thereafter without any promise of rewards as well)
and it generated more than 38,000 micro-tasks from the
crowd. The mapping exercise in high denition routes as
shown in Figure 2, and, as can be seen from this example,
remote users were successful at performing mapping tasks
even though sometimes they were corrected by the few lo-
cal residents who participated and knew the area well. The
AMT deployment was run in only 6 hours and generated
more than 8,500 micro-tasks. In what follows, we elaborate
on the web-app deployment, which we will term, the `Local'
setting for the rest of this section and describe how the in-
centives applied at various stages of the deployment allowed
us to engage with dierent communities of users. We then
compare these results with the AMT deployment and discuss
the advantages and disadvantages of the two approaches.
(a) Original Map. (b) Map with routes.
Figure 2: Example of the results of Collabmap where
remote users along with local residents drew routes
for a given area. Note that a simple `nearest road to
building' approach to automatically drawing routes
would not be particularly eective and shows how
this task is non-trivial for an algorithm to do.
5.1 Local Deployment
In this setting, we advertised to a number of communities at
dierent times during the deployment. Through our link to
Hampshire County Council, we were able to access a number
of organisations across the region around the Fawley ren-
ery. This included local government agencies, companies
with facilities located at the renery, and local libraries and
community centres. This was mainly done via email and
phone calls directly to such agencies. We also targeted local
newspapers and blogs which were forthcoming in helping us
advertise the deployment and invited users to contribute.
The total cost in advertising reached about $300. Following
lack of involvement from the local community (details fol-
low in the Results section), we also targeted local students
and sta at our University through mailing lists, social me-
dia, and news articles on the University's web pages (from
the 6th of February onwards). Overall, through these ini-
tiatives, we received over 2,200 hits on the main Collabmap
page (i.e., excluding task execution pages) over the duration
of the deployment, with 793 unique visitors.
5.1.1 Data Collection
To collect data, participants were requested to ll in a regis-
tration form (following usual ethics approval) which allowed
us to collect participants' usernames (rather than real names
to keep them anonymised), email, age, and location (both
town and country). Thus, the deployment resulted in 118
participants from 8 dierent countries, where 90% were res-
ident in the UK. As expected, a large number of these par-
ticipants were from Southampton (65) but, to our surprise,
only 6 participants were from the area around Fawley (not
counted as part of Southampton). Moreover, out these 6
participants only 2 made it into the top 35 contributors who
contributed more than 100 tasks to the platform, the rest
being University students and sta. While performing the
tasks, participants were also allowed to feedback on indi-
vidual tasks and we collected over 120 comments from the
crowd (most of them from the top contributors).
5.1.2 Incentive Schemes
The low turn-out from the local community was a key driver
to alter the incentive scheme during the deployment at vari-
ous stages, in order to maximise participation in the system.
In turn, we tried the following incentive schemes over dier-
ent timescales:1. Lottery-based reward|December 2011 to Febru-
ary 13th, 2012|we set up a lottery mechanism by
which participants to the platform would be allocated
tickets based on the number of tasks performed. For
every 10 micro-tasks completed, a participant would
receive 1 ticket to be drawn at random in order to
win one of two prizes of $100 and $200. Furthermore,
we ensured only valid tasks counted; that is, only tasks
that had been voted up by other participants. This re-
ward mechanism was accompanied by a leader board
that showed the top 10 contributors to the platform
along with the total number of tasks performed by each
participant. If a given participant was out of the top
10, she was shown her rank on the leader board along
with her contributions.
2. Lottery+Competition-based reward|February
13th to February 24th, 2012|we advised participants
that the reward scheme was changing on the 13th of
February given the the low contributions received that
far into the deployment. Thus, we increased the lottery-
based reward to the following scheme to get more par-
ticipants into the system while keeping the same ticket
allocation system. In particulars, 8 lottery-based prizes
were to be given out: one $300, one $200, and six
$50. We also included a top prize of $100 in the sys-
tem (which proved to be a key driver). Moreover, we
changed the leader board to reect the competitive na-
ture of the interaction with the system by removing the
number of total tasks completed from the leader board.
This was done to prevent participants from losing mo-
tivation if they saw the number of tasks completed
by the top contributors, meaning thinking they would
never be able to win the top prize. However, they were
able to see how many tasks were left for them to beat
the competitor just above them. Skewing the presenta-
tion of contributions in this way is common practice in
gaming systems and is meant to keep a participant en-
gaged in a two-player game with clearer rewards (i.e.,
beating the one above) than in multi-player settings
where one may be too far behind to hope to win any-
thing (the player's rank only gives a clue but not com-
plete information).
As can be seen from the above setup, we increased the re-
wards from a total of $300 to $900. However, the probabil-
ity of winning with increased rewards was also smaller as the
players also expected an increase in the number of competi-
tors. The guaranteed reward of $100 for the top contributor
was a key driver to get large numbers of tasks done as we
show in the next section.
5.1.3 Results
Here we analyse the results of the local deployment and dis-
cuss the features of the work produced during the Local
deployment. In turn, we present results with regards to par-
ticipation, work done, and quality of work done.
Incentives to Participate
Our incentive schemes clearly had dierent impacts on dier-
ent communities. As can be seen from the results provided
on Figure 3 the advertising drive targetted the local com-
munity did not work well (but for one contributor). Over
a period of a month, only about 20 participants signed up,
some of whom were researchers interested in the project, and
only 3 from the local community. As conrmed by Figure 4,
the number of tasks performed by this pool of participants
was negligible.
When further advertising events hit the University, the num-
ber of participants can be seen to nearly triple around the
6th of February. At this point, clearly the students were
interested in the lottery-based reward and joined in masses.
However, the number of tasks performed was still relatively
low. This clearly points to the weakness in the incentive
scheme in not being high enough or competitive enough for
the students to engage with the system. On February 13th,
2012, with the announcement of the Lottery+Competition
incentive scheme, not only did the number of participants
rise further (by 300%, see Figure 3) but the number of tasks
signicantly jumped as can be seen on Figure 4.
Turning to the details of Figure 4, it can ben noted that dif-
ferent participants performed dierent numbers of tasks at
various times. Clearly, two contributors performed many of
the tasks (the top two contributors contributed nearly 9000
tasks each) and there is a clear distinction between them.
Indeed, one contributor, who we will call participant T, who
lives in the area around Fawley, joined the system very early
on and did large numbers of tasks on a daily basis from Jan-
uary 25th, 2012 onwards; while the other top participant,
who we will call S, a student who lives in Southampton,
joined the system as soon as the platform was advertised to
the University (i.e., on February 6th), did moderate number
of tasks for two days and then stopped.
While T did varying amounts of work on a daily basis, S
clearly contributed signicant amounts as soon as the new
Lottery+Competition scheme was put in place. Several oth-
ers joined (at least 4 other participants, mainly students) at
the same time (they had not joined on February 6th) but
were obviously not as successful at S (who did nearly 4500
tasks in one day, which, at a rate of 20 seconds per task
would take about 25 hours). These results tell us that the
students were clearly more motivated by the competition
than the lottery or the social benets of the task, particu-
larly when we study the lack of participation between the
6th and the 13th of February.
Behaviour of the Top Participants
Following interviews with S and T, we found that, as ex-
pected, S and T had dierent motives. In particular, it was
found that S, keen on winning the competition, crowdsourced
his tasks to friends that were either based in Southampton
or abroad (in a dierent time zone), which would explain the
number of tasks completed in a day. The strategy employed
involved opening multiple browser windows and performing
as many tasks in parallel as possible (e.g., doing a task on
one page while another page loads another task). Sharing
of login information was not prevented by our rules and,
clearly, this participant exploited this. However, this back-
red at some point.
When asking friends to perform tasks, S did not specify to
them how well the tasks must be performed and, as a result,
many tasks ended up being performed really poorly (build-
ings being drawn as triangles|as allowed by our system as
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other contributors when incorrect). As the tasks performed
by S degraded, it became apparent that such a strategy was
not working and S had to stop the `sub-crowdsourcing' of
tasks. Such behaviours are reminiscent of AMT where a
number of `companies' hire teams of `turkers' in order to
perform tasks under a single username in order to maximise
rewards.
T, in contrast, was only partially motivated by the mone-
tary gains and clearly expressed an interest in the project
to build the simulation map. This is evidenced by T's per-
formance of tasks going beyond the announcement of the
results of the lottery/competition winners as shown on Fig-
ure 4. Also, as can be seen beyond the announcement of
the Lottery+Competition (February 13th), T did not adopt
alternative means to increase task performance and was also
constrained by work commitments (students clearly had an
advantage in this case).
The other students who contributed a large chunk of the
tasks were not as strategically aggressive nor as altruistic
as S and T, which points the fact that these are extremal
behaviours rather than the average case. However, these re-
sults show that, in the design of crowdsourcing platforms,
it is important to take into account both types of extremes
in building the workow and incentives in order to max-
imise task completion. In our deployment, we reached out
to a small population and, if such a deployment were to be
carried out on a large scale, we would expect such extreme
behaviours to be more widespread.
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Task Types
The nature of tasks and the workow within which they t in
Collabmap imply that contributors can only perform some
11A similar behaviour is observed for example on Google's
MapMaker, for example, where they report: \One of our
most prolic US users is a woman with over 100,000 edits.
The interesting thing is that the vast majority of her edits
are in Senegal, a place she's never been before. How and
why does she do it? Well, she has an academic interest in
the topic of Senegal, so she looks at the satellite images
and creates roads where they show up in the images,
then lets local users ll in the data, which they often do
quickly."|at http://thenextweb.com/google/2011/05/
28/the-story-behind-googles-map-maker-editing-app/1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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Figure 5: Distribution of task types across the top
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tasks if other contributors have acted in the system before.
The fact that the initial task involves drawing buildings,
it is clear that the arrival of tasks in the system will skew
the distribution of tasks across the participants. Figure 5
shows that the top contributors were the ones doing the
most building drawing tasks, while the other contributors
were playing catch-up by verifying and correcting tasks done
by their leaders. This `race' condition generated reactions
from the crowd which were characterised as follows:
1. Lack of tasks in the system and boredom|reported
by participant T initially, as he was given too many
buildings to draw and found the tasks getting increas-
ingly boring. This issue was exacerbated by the fact
that participants could not initially draw routes for
buildings they had drawn but this constraint was re-
laxed in our workow in order to allow more tasks to
be completed by motivated contributors.
2. Unfairness in task distribution|those who came into
the system later in the deployment were given veri-
cation tasks for many buildings drawn by earlier con-
tributors. This is because the workow prioritised such
tasks in order for contributors to move to route draw-
ing tasks (which was the main aim of the exercise). As
verication tasks are easier (take seconds as opposed
to up to a minute for a drawing task), the top contrib-
utors complained of getting too many drawing tasks
to do.
The above issues were clearly a result of a unique mix of
events that are peculiar to some crowdsourcing platforms
where participant arrival rate is not constant and this ham-
pers the eorts of the most eager contributors. In partic-
ular, as in our case the top contributors performed tasks
reasonably well, with hindsight, it was unnecessary to im-
pose consensus-based metrics to restrict their actions in the
system as per our workow. However, our workow allowed
us to detect anomalies in the population (such as the poor
sub-crowdsourced tasks discussed above) and, hence, weed
out poor performance. These constraints are therefore a
necessary evil in a system with keen and trustworthy con-
tributors. Our interaction with the crowd showed that it is
important to communicate with them the reason for the be-
haviour of the system in order to prevent them from leaving
(we did this through exchange of emails based on received
in-task feedbacks).
6. AMT DEPLOYMENT
As introduced earlier, Collabmap implements the feature of
crowdsourcing its micro-tasks also through AMT. We next
discuss the system setup and the results of the deployment
as we varied the incentives in the system.
6.1 System Setup
An AMT extension was developed to allow Collabmap to
combine inputs from AMT with those from users coming
from local crowds. By so doing, we aimed to ensure su-
cient participants engaged with the system to complete the
mapping of the area. In what follows, however, we focus
only on the AMT deployment. In more detail, the exten-
sion allowed us to post a certain number of tasks on the
AMT crowdsourcing market, and to specify the reward to
be paid for each task. Then, for each task, an AMT human
intelligent task (HIT) is created and is immediately available
to the community of the AMT workers. It should be noted
that no worker requirement or qualication was specied for
a HIT (typically used to make the HIT available only to a
subset of targeted workers) since we aimed to reach a high
rate of HIT acceptance amongst the largest pool of available
workers. Indeed, setting these requirements is still an area
of research as the trade-o between rate of task completion
and quality of work is not well understood. Moreover, we
rejected work that was obviously wrong (i.e., no buildings
with fewer than 3 corners and roads not connecting to a
building) and accepted the rest of the submitted work.
To allow AMT workers to access our server, HITs are created
using the\external question"AMT template which displays
the Collabmap task execution page in a frame in the worker's
web browser. Furthermore, in order to provide an interested
worker with the basics of a Collabmap task, the HIT can be
rst previewed with an example of the drawing task and the
verication task. Once the worker accepts the HIT, a new
Collabmap user is automatically created in our database, or
an existing user is logged in for a returning worker, and one
of the available micro-tasks is assigned to such a user. This
allows the system to keep track of AMT workers and prevent
them from verifying their own work.
6.2 Results
In our deployment, we analysed the response of the workers
and the frequency of task executions with an incremental
reward strategy as follows. In the rst hour, 100 Collabmap
HITs were posted, for the reward of $0.01 for each HIT,
and only 8 tasks were accepted, i.e. 0.13 tasks/min. In
the second hour, a batch of 100 HITs was posted with the
increased reward of $0.02 per HIT. These were completed in
less than 40 minutes, i.e . 2.5 tasks/min. Then, we set the
price to $0.03 for a new batch of 1500 HITs, and these were
also all completed within 90 minutes, thus, the acceptance
rate grew to 16.3 tasks/min. Finally, as we noticed that
an increasing number of eager workers were keen in taking
Collabmap, then we published a larger set of more than 7000
HITs, paying $0.02 each. Thesewere completed in less than
three hours at the average rate of 44 tasks/min.1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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Figure 6: Distribution of task types across the top
10 participants for AMT.
Summing up, in the 4 trials, we were able to recruit 150
AMT workers in less than six hours, paying a total cost of
$187. The workers completed 8,979 micro-tasks. However,
the AMT deployment generated data of signicantly lesser
quality compared to the those from the local deployment.
6.3 Local versus AMT deployments
The task completion rates in the Local and AMT deploy-
ments were signicantly dierent as noted from the pre-
vious results. During both the deployments, we recorded
data about the duration of tasks d, the rate at which tasks
were completed , and the ratio of drawing tasks to veri-
cation tasks  |to analyse how signicant were the par-
ticipants' disagreements about the correctness/completion
of tasks. Furthermore, we separated the data for the local
deployment into two parts to t the two incentive schemes
we used. We also captured the results across both of the
schemes. The data is reported in Table 1.
Our results show that AMT workers, who completed tasks
rapidly, did not perform to a high quality standard. On
aggregate AMT workers completed tasks orders of mag-
nitude faster ( at 44 per minute) than those in the lo-
cal deployment ( at 1.7 per minute at best for the Lot-
tery+Competition condition). Moreover, the duration of
tasks is signicantly lower in AMT (d at 9.4 seconds com-
pared to 23.5 for the Lottery condition) which shows that
they are out there to exploit the reward scheme. However,
not all tasks were poorly performed though they were worse
than in the Local deployment. For example, a study of the
votes cast on buildings reveals that the ratio of poorly drawn
buildings (as voted down by one or more participants) to the
total number of buildings, in the Local deployment is 8%,
while in AMT, this number rises to 35%, that is more than
four-fold. This is not so unexpected given that signicant
lters were not applied to AMT workers. However, per-
forming a cost-benet analysis
12 reveals that the payout for
38,000 micro-tasks would be around $500 for AMT (at $0.02
per task), while in the Local deployment, the total payout
was $700. However, nearly $175 would be lost in the AMT
deployment if 35% of the tasks were performed poorly. In
turn, in the Local deployment, we would expect the cost per
task to drop further if we allowed the deployment to run for
12We ignore the advertising costs for the local deployment.
Combined Lottery Lottery+Comp AMT
d 14:4  0:27 23:5  0:6 11:64  0:23 9:4  0:38
 0.35 1.5 0.22 0.24
 0.33 0.07 1.7 44
Table 1: Table showing durations (d) in seconds and
drawing v/s verication ratios (), and task perfor-
mance rate ( per minute). 95% condence intervals
around the means are also given for task duration.
an extra day or so. Building more constraints into AMT
will obviously increase costs and therefore render it more
expensive, though faster than our Local Deployment.
In the AMT deployment, we noticed many routes being
drawn in similar ways to the kind of routes we obtained from
the local deployment. People clearly had dierent views on
what an evacuation route was and where it should lead to
as in the local deployment. As can be seen from Table 1,
the ratio of tasks to verications is very similar between
AMT and the Lottery+Competition condition ( is 0.22
and 0.24), whereas the Lottery condition had few partici-
pants contributing a lot and was restricted by the workow
from doing verication tasks (hence  = 1:5). The local
deployment signicantly gained from the work performed
by participant T who, based on his local knowledge, drew
routes that were not clearly visible on the aerial view. Find-
ing and exploiting such local knowledge within the timescale
of an AMT deployment would be a signicant challenge, if
not impossible.
Also note the distribution of tasks in Figure 6, which con-
trasts sharply against the results we obtained in the Local
deployment (Figure 5). The reason for this is that many
more participants were active in AMT at the same time.
While the tasks seem fairly distributed across participants,
participant number 6 has a signicantly higher number of
building drawing tasks. This was due to the participant be-
ing the rst to enter the system and therefore creating tasks
for others.
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented Collabmap, a crowdsourcing
platform to help collect data to construct a high-resolution
map for disaster simulation. The Collabmap workow di-
vides the task of creating evacuation routes into micro-tasks
that can be performed independently by large numbers of
participants. The application was deployed over a period of
3 months with two dierent incentive schemes, Lottery and
Lottery+Competition. Our deployments revealed how hard
it was to harness a local community's intrinsic motivations
and led us to resort to more extrinsic/social motivations us-
ing increased lottery payments and a competition. In what
follows we discuss key implications of our work for web sci-
ence and Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) research, with
a particular focus on the use of crowd. We nish with an
outline of future work.
7.1 Implications for Web Science Research
Our deployment of Collabmap raises the issue of how crowd-
sourcing platforms should be evaluated. Our `in the wild'
13The top ten AMT workers completed the following numbers
of tasks in total each: 812, 805, 780, 757, 718, 697, 692, 476,
448, 325.deployment with the local community and University pop-
ulations (more knowledgeable of web technologies) showed
that dierent arrival rates of participants in the system could
signicantly aect the participants' interaction with the sys-
tem; part of which was imposed by the workow, and part
of which is aected by the other participants in the system.
Essentially, this close linkage between individual interactions
and system dynamics point to the need for new tools such as
control theory and multi-agent simulation, to quantify the
impact of dierent crowd behaviours (acting as the input)
into the system. This cannot be done, however, without
a clear understanding of the impact of incentives on user
engagement in the specic context of application.
Incentive Schemes Prior to our work, several papers in
the HCI and Web communities have looked at incentives in
crowdsourcing (see Section 2) and clearly point to the use
of extrinsic motivations as the means for maximising task
completion and completion rates. It is also well known that
trust issues are rampant on platforms such as AMT, though
others such as Crowdower, have mechanisms in place to
improve performance. However, the interplay between in-
centives is rather poorly studied to date and our deployment
is but one example of work contrasting incentive types over
dierent time scales and comparing them side-by-side. Our
results show that a mix of incentives may be best to get tasks
done quickly but also to a high degree of quality. More im-
portantly, targeting populations with dierent capabilities
(e.g., web technology-aware v/s local knowledge aware) and
using the best of both could potentially be useful to im-
prove a number of planning-oriented crowdsourcing applica-
tions (e.g., emergency planning, redevelopment of run-down
areas given pictures on StreetView
14, or remote sensing of
land conditions as in GeoWiki). This is in line with insights
from behavioural game theory that show how monetary and
social motivations can engender dierent levels of eort [5].
Community-sourcing Harnessing the expertise of a local
community was the key goal of Collabmap and, to a lim-
ited extent, this was successful in our initial Local deploy-
ment. Our work, in this sense resonates with `Community-
sourcing' ideas of Heimerl et al. [3] where a physical device
with very specic extrinsic incentives was used. However,
going beyond localised interactions such as theirs (which
was very successful), in Collabmap we tried to access local
communities of experts spread over a region (and who knew
their own region well), appealing to their intrinsic motiva-
tions and along with some monetary rewards (though with
some uncertainty). The cheapest way to access these pop-
ulations was through the media but this was only partially
successful. Hence, we believe that for such large-scale de-
ployments, it is crucial to research better incentive schemes
or artefacts that are cheap to deploy and improve user en-
gagement without undermining the quality of tasks.
7.2 Future Work
Future work in Collabmap will look at some of the above
research challenges, with a particular focus on combining
local knowledge and the speed of AMT. Moreover, we aim
to improve the workow to avoid unfairness in task distri-
bution across workers and also reduce the creation of poor
building drawing tasks by AMT workers. To do so, we en-
14www.ratesouthampton.com
visage dening `gold' tasks [9] that, for such a domain, can
be quite challenging to create (cheaply) given the dierent
views people have of what a building or evacuation route is.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by the EPSRC-Funded ORCHID
Project EP/I011587/1 and an EPSRC-funded Knowledge
Transfer Secondment EP/C548051/1. We thank Ruben Stran-
ders for initial work on design and implementation and Ian
Hoult at Hampshire County Council for his support.
8. REFERENCES
[1] M. S. Bernstein, G. Little, R. C. Miller, B. Hartmann,
M. S. Ackerman, D. R. Karger, D. Crowell, and
K. Panovich. Soylent: a word processor with a crowd
inside. In Proceedings of UIST 2010, pages 313{322, 2010.
[2] M. G. Findley, M. C. Gleave, R. N. Morello, and D. L.
Nielson. Extrinsic, intrinsic, and social incentives for
crowdsourcing development information in uganda: A eld
experiment. Working Paper, 2012.
[3] K. Heimerl, B. Gawalt, K. Chen, T. Parikh, and
B. Hartmann. Communitysourcing: engaging local crowds
to perform expert work via physical kiosks. In Proceedings
of the 2012 ACM annual conference on Human Factors in
Computing Systems, CHI '12, pages 1539{1548, New York,
NY, USA, 2012. ACM.
[4] C. Heipke. Crowdsourcing geospatial data. ISPRS Journal
of Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing, 65(6):550{557,
2010.
[5] J. Heyman and D. Ariely. Eort for payment a tale of two
markets. Psychological Science, 15(11):787{793, 2004.
[6] W. S. Lasecki, R. Wesley, A. Kulkarni, and J. P. Bigham.
Speaking with the crowd. In Proceedings of the Symposium
on User Interface Software and Technology (UIST 2012),
2012.
[7] W. Mason and D. J. Watts. Financial incentives and the
"performance of crowds". In Proceedings of the ACM
SIGKDD Workshop on Human Computation, HCOMP '09,
pages 77{85, New York, NY, USA, 2009. ACM.
[8] J. Nielsen. Participation inequality: Encouraging more
users to contribute, 2006. http://www.useit.com/
alertbox/participation_inequality.html.
[9] A. J. Quinn and B. B. Bederson. Human computation: a
survey and taxonomy of a growing eld. In Proceedings of
the 2011 annual conference on Human factors in
computing systems, CHI '11, pages 1403{1412, New York,
NY, USA, 2011. ACM.
[10] J. C. Tang, M. Cebrian, N. A. Giacobe, H.-W. Kim,
T. Kim, and D. B. Wickert. Reecting on the darpa red
balloon challenge. Commun. ACM, 54(4):78{85, Apr. 2011.
[11] S. Van Wart, K. J. Tsai, and T. Parikh. Local ground: a
paper-based toolkit for documenting local geo-spatial
knowledge. In Proceedings of the First ACM Symposium on
Computing for Development, ACM DEV '10, pages
11:1{11:10, New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM.
[12] L. Von Ahn, R. Liu, and M. Blum. Peekaboom: a game for
locating objects in images. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI
conference on Human Factors in computing systems, pages
55{64. ACM, 2006.
[13] H. Zhang, E. Horvitz, and R. C. Miller. Crowdsourcing
general computation. In CHI Workshop on Human
Computation, 2011.
[14] H. Zhang, E. Law, R. Miller, K. Gajos, D. Parkes, and
E. Horvitz. Human computation tasks with global
constraints. In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM annual
conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, CHI
'12, pages 217{226, New York, NY, USA, 2012. ACM.
[15] M. Zook, M. Graham, T. Shelton, and S. Gorman.
Volunteered geographic information and crowdsourcing
disaster relief: A case study of the haitian earthquake.
World Medical and Health Policy, 2(2), 2010.